Ressourcen
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Book:
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ID no. (ISBN etc.): 9781584873259
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BibTex Zitationsschlüssel: Myerson2007
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Myerson, Roger B. 2007. Force and restraint in strategic deterrence: A game-theorist's perspective. Advancing strategic thought series. Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College.
von: Max de Molière 2010-11-19 14:04:05
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Kategorie(n): Computerspielphilologie/GameStudies
Schlagwörter: Deterrence (Strategy), Game theory., Games of strategy (Mathematics), International relations., Mathematical models.
Autor(en): Myerson
Herausgeber: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College (Carlisle PA)
Bibliographies: CSP-MehrbenutzerBib, Game Studies
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Angeschaut: 1079
Beliebtheitsindex: 3.73%
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Abstract
"In a dangerous world, we need to think very carefully about how military force is used. Game theory can serve us in such analyses by providing a framework for probing the inextricable connections between our adversaries' decision problems and our own. To illustrate the power of game theory, the author focuses on a vital question that confronts American policymakers today: what determines why an application of military force, which was intended to deter potential adversaries, sometimes instead stimulates them to more militant reactions against us? When we feel that force is necessary, what can we do to minimize the risk of such adverse reactions?" -- p. v.
von: Max de Molière
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